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This paper employs the bandwagon bias effect theory to explain the influence of institutional investors on 
CSR Practices. This study focuses on Nigeria and uses the bandwagon bias theory to explore how 
institutional investors are being influenced by peer and society pressure to go along with the crowd to 
conform to CSR industrial standards. Using the balanced panel data of 174 PLCs from 2003 to 2009, the 
study investigates the institutional investors influence on CSR. The findings indicate a significant 
manifestation of relationship between them, which implies that the bandwagon effect on firm’s CSR 
engagement exists. 
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INTRODUCTION    
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has become an extremely important economic, social and 
political factor in both developed and developing countries (Carroll, 1991; 1999; Fernandez et al., 2016; 
Maroun 2020). The adoption of CSR by Multinational companies (MNCs) as well as indigenous companies 
(Zadek, 2001; Gul et al., 2020) has been attributed to increasing public concerns. These public concerns 
have attracted the attention of institutional investors in transnational companies to help reduce such 
concerns in terms of the operations of companies and their practices which include human rights abuses, 
ethical issues, governance problems, climate change and environmental issues, employees welfares, 
consumer protection, oil spillage, gas flaring as well as dumping of toxic wastes in public places and rivers 
(Oyefusi, 2007b; Ehikioya, 2009 and Idemudia, 2009; Motta and Uchida 2017, Motta and Uchida 2017). 
As these bad practices lead to corporate scandals, loss of lives, environmental degradation, reputational 
damage, huge fines, increased costs and corporate failures (Brammer and Millington, 2005; Brammer and 
Pavelin, 2006; Zadek, 2006; Crane et al., 2008; Gul et al., 2020) there has become the need for institutional 
2 | P a g e  
investors to act by using their influence on policies to ensure the long-term survival of companies (Carroll, 
1999; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Chai, 2010; Wahba, 2010). 
Generally, institutional investors are under pressure from peers to address these social problems arising 
from company operations. This can be attributed to strong ownership concentration, technical knowledge 
and huge capital resources at their disposal which drive their interest in business operations. Therefore, 
institutional investors pressurize companies to invest in philanthropic and CSR activities. Philanthropic 
activities are the commonest CSR practices in developing countries (Helg, 2007). When institutional 
investors invest in developing economies, they continue the same CSR path practiced by other companies. 
They assume that philanthropic activity is common and a group thing to do, hence they put pressure on 
companies to continue the same CSR path such as charities and donations to communities. This peer 
pressure on institutional investors leads to the bandwagon bias effect. They can accomplish this because 
some institutional investors are not only present as board members, but also involved in the decision-
making process of companies, particularly in formulating policies. As a result, they pressurize companies 
to formulate policies that address these social concerns (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; 1997; Salehi 2017). 
Recent developments reveal that stakeholders have been pressuring companies to conform to industrial 
social standards (Mullerat, 2009; Aras and Crowther, 2010 and Misani, 2010; Motta and Uchida 2017; 
Harjoto et al, 2017). Consequently, this paper examines how the bandwagon effect theory drives 
institutional investors to pressure companies to invest in philanthropic activities. 
This peer pressure is called the conformity syndrome and bandwagon bias effect (Misani, 2010). The 
bandwagon bias theory occurs when companies that are influenced by peer pressure, copy CSR activities 
from other companies. As more companies join the practice, regardless of their own organizational belief 
and culture, the more the bandwagon group grows. In general, peer pressure is a form of social pressure by 
a group upon an individual who must take action in order to be accepted or seen as conforming. The peer 
pressure is regarded as an influence on a group or individual by another to change their values, or behaviors 
in other to suit other people’s convenience. This could lead to a snowballing effect as more companies join 
the bandwagon concept, which can seriously lead to either a beneficial or harmful effect (Snowball effect 
2020; Mullerat, 2009). 
The reasons for the occurrence of bandwagon effect among companies vary. Some critics say they do 
this for regulatory purposes, image making while others concur as a way of avoiding extra cost and 
maximizing profit (Amaeshi, 2008; Mullerat, 2009; Aras and Crowther, 2010; Hoi et al., 2018). Also, the 
bandwagon effect occurs when one party or group believes and accepts a majority opinion or viewpoint 
even without enough evidence. They want to be on the winning side or majority viewpoint. The bandwagon 
effect applies to individuals drawing inferences from decisions of others thereby relying on situations 
involving majority opinion. 
Therefore, the question that arises is, why is it that institutional investors are not implementing the same 
strategic CSR practices that are dominant in developed economies in developing countries, as against mere 
support for philanthropy, charity or cash donations? 
By not advocating for the same CSR programs in developing countries, they can be accused of double 
standards by resorting to play lip service by following and doing what majority of the companies are already 
doing. By following other companies CSR practices irrespective of their own culture, values and visions, 
institutional investors are characterized as having a bias effect. These companies jump into the bandwagon 
group just because others are doing it, unlike what obtains in developed countries (English, 2010). The 
institutional investors from developed countries advocate for strategic CSR which is conspicuously absent 
in developed countries (Helg, 2007). 
Essentially, the justification for the study is based on increased awareness of organizational CSR 
activities in Africa, with particular emphasis on Nigeria. There has been increased expectation that 
companies should be socially responsible in their business operations (Webb, 2004). In this regard, Nigeria 
was chosen as a focal point of study because of the country’s huge natural resources and rapid economic 
growth (Ehikioya, 2009; Ezeoha and Okafor, 2010; Soliman et al., 2012). The Nigerian government has 
taken major steps in an attempt not only to reform the economy, but also to improve the investment climate 
and attract local, regional and foreign direct investments (Ahunwan, 2002). The study is structured as 
3 | P a g e  
follows: the theoretical framework and literature review, methodology, discussion of results and conclusion. 
The next section considers the literature review that further provides insight into the heterogeneous nature 
of institutional investors and how they affect CSR activities in companies. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This study employs the bandwagon theory effect to understand the influence of institutional investors 
in CSR practices. The bandwagon bias effect is based on the notion that people derive information socially 
from others and have the tendency to follow or copy what others are doing in CSR regardless of their 
organizational belief, culture or performance (Carson, 2012; Rao and Tilt 2016). This bandwagon effect 
causes changes in organizational variance thereby shaping CSR practices of companies. The relationship 
between institutions and how corporations implement policies should satisfy the interest of a wider group 
of stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Freeman and McVea, 2001). By this, companies develop the institutional 
norms, values and cultures that satisfy all stakeholders (Turban and Greening, 1997; Johnson and Greening, 
1999; Freeman and McVea, 2001; Salehi 2017; Yuan et al., 2020). 
Nevertheless, some authors disagree that CSR-bandwagon effect still occurs (English; 2010) whilst 
what exists is strategic CSR (Hess et al., 2002). This may be true for advanced countries. According to 
English (2010), CSR no longer has a bandwagon effect, but strategic effect. The author argued that the 
bandwagon stage or phase has passed. A strategic CSR program is now a business standard and a necessity 
to effectively compete in the marketplace. This maybe the case in developed countries while in developing 
countries, the bandwagon effect still exits. According to Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1993) institutional 
bandwagon effect exists because non-adopters of CSR programs fear appearing different from many who 
accept it. They are afraid of below-average performance if various competitors profit from adopting the 
same CSR programs. Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1993) studied inter-organizational imitation and 
mimetic isomorphism and came up with a suggestion that legitimacy-based reference groups guide firms 
in their mimetic behavior, that firms undertake imitation even against their own ex ante information, and 
that legitimacy-based imitation contributes negatively to firms' profitability. On the same note, 
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) argued that informational cascade occurs when it is optimal 
for an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding 
individual with regard to his own information. 
Many factors have been identified as possible triggers of the bandwagon effect for organizational 
CSR practices. These include the financial market, self-image, sustainability rankings, corporate culture, 
avoidance of fees and fines, regulation, political context, or civil society (Eva, 2011; Hoi et al., 2018). These 
factors can cause a company to blow their trumpet about their CSR activities. They do this to keep and 
maintain their position in the financial and capital market. Also, Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) 
such as Human Rights groups, Trade Unions, consumer activists and advocacy groups can pressure 
companies to jump into the bandwagon effect and implement certain CSR activities so as to gain legitimacy 
(Eva, 2011; Rao and Klein, 2013; Yuan et al., 2020). Therefore, Institutional investors pressurize companies 
to conform to industrial standards of CSR strategies rather than allowing them to individually perform or 
be creative and unique. 
The negative aspect of the bandwagon effect is the weakness on people’s behaviour when it is based 
on limited information or information which is subject to change. This form of group thinking affects 
individuals who follow the trend based on limited information. Hence, the bandwagon effect which is a 
cognitive social bias that implies that conduct and beliefs spread like fire, with the probability of adoption 
increasing in proportion with how many people have already done or believed so (Bandwagon, 2013). 
Therefore, the bandwagon effect means going along with the crowd or jumping on the bandwagon due to 
peer or society pressure or because individuals derive information from others. Cognition is the mental 
process of knowing, awareness, perception, reasoning and judgment. It means that this type of bias is 
associated with wrong ways in which people deal with knowledge or the lack thereof. 
The bandwagon effects are a pattern of deviation in judgment, whereby inferences about other people 
and situations may be drawn in an illogical fashion. Examples are the confirmation bias which contributes 
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to over confidence in personal beliefs which can maintain or strengthen beliefs in the face of contrary 
evidence. Poor decisions due to these biases have been found in military, political, organizational and social 
contexts, particularly now in CSR among developing countries. People create their own reality of events 
and their perception of these events may dictate their behavior in companies which sometimes lead to 
distortion of facts, inaccurate judgment, illogical interpretation or conclusion. Another bandwagon 
effect’s cognitive social bias is the notion that people derive information from others and have a tendency 
to follow along with what others are doing (Bandwagon, 2013). Some negative results of the bandwagon 
effect include mass stock market crashes and economic depressions (Wasik, 2013). 
 
Institutional Investors and Bandwagon Effect 
CSR practices are good platforms for bandwagons, since they are often characterized by high ambiguity 
and considered to be multi-dimensional in nature with no single definition of it (Carroll, 1999). Therefore, 
the main interest of institutional investors on companies’ CSR activities centre around reducing cost and 
addressing environmental issues especially in relation to how social issues must be addressed by firms and 
the consequences that await culprits by failing to address those issues or concerns. However, there are some 
companies that do not want to conform but want to be innovative and creative in their CSR activities (Helg, 
2007; Amaeshi, 2008; Amaeshi, 2010; Amaeshi and Amao, 2009; Fernandez et al., 2016). They want to be 
seen as successful as they perform their CSR programs (Amaeshi and Amao, 2009; Gul et al., 2020; Maroun 
2020). They expect institutional investors to put pressure on other companies to allow their CSR programs 
to be reflective of not only the African culture, but also on the values, beliefs and vision of the companies 
rather than imposing the Anglo-Saxon CSR model as a result of the bandwagon bias effect. The bandwagon 
process is believed to be appreciated by institutional investors who involve industry members who are 
creative, innovative and imitators as there seems to be no place for external actors that exert pressure on 
firms to accelerate adoption. On the contrary, in the case of CSR, clearly, stakeholders exert pressure and 
are able to sanction firms that do not adhere to the international best practices’ mantra. Notable examples 
include the most adopted standards such as the SA8000 or the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), developed 
by independent organizations. 
The kind of processes that bandwagon activates depends exclusively on firms competing against each 
other. In contrast, industry codes of conduct, certified management standards and other best practices in 
CSR often involve deliberate cooperation among firms in the same industry, or between firms in the 
industry and stakeholders. A firm that does not adopt a recommended practice risks stakeholders’ sanctions, 
which can cause them to lag behind in terms of competing with others in the marketplace. Therefore, 
stakeholder interventions and cooperation among peers should be taken into consideration in analyzing why 
firms are reluctant to go their own way in dealing with social issues. 
 
Institutional Ownership and Corporate Social Responsibility 
There are various forms of institutional investors who determine the corporate ownership of companies. 
These are the majority or minority shareholders. They are made up of management, indigenous, foreign, 
government, public, private and family ownerships. It has been found that institutional investors have 
different preferences for CSR (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Neubaum and 
Zahra, 2006). Based on these different preferences, several authors have distinguished institutional 
investors into different groups (Cumming and Johan, 2004; Lydenberg, 2007; Rashid and Lodh, 2008). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) divided institutional investors into large and diffused (small) investors. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) found that diffused shareholders are disadvantaged due to information asymmetry and 
have less motivation to monitor the board whilst institutional investors do not only put pressure on managers 
to perform, but also demand accountability and transparency from them (Johnson and Greening, 1999). 
However, this study focuses on indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors because they are 
common and obtainable in Nigeria. 
Previous studies on the role of institutional investors on CSR are mixed and inconclusive (Waddock 
and Graves, 1997; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Mckendall et al, 1999; Cox et al, 2004; Neubaum and 
Zahra, 2006; Chai, 2010; Wahba, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2016). Studies found institutional investors such 
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as long term and short-term investors have different preferences for CSR (Waddock and Graves, 1997; 
Johnson and Greening, 1999; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006). While long term institutional investors support 
CSR, short-term institutional investors do not support CSR (Johnson and Greening, 1999). In addition, 
Johnson and Greening (1999); Graves and Waddock (1994) found that institutional investors have a positive 
impact on CSR while others found negative and inconclusive results (Earnhart and Lizal, 1999; 2002). 
These mixed and inconclusive findings further suggest that more studies are needed to examine the 
relationship between different institutional investors and CSR starting with indigenous institutional 
investors. 
As a result, this study attempts to address two basic research objectives: 
(a) To investigate the role of institutional investors on CSR; and 
(b) To determine how institutional investors are being influenced by peer and society pressure to 
go along with the crowd to conform to CSR industrial standards. 
 
Hypothesis Formation: Indigenous Institutional Investors and Corporate Social Responsibility 
It was after Nigeria gained independence from the British colonial authority in 1960 that the agitation 
for economic self-independence increased. There was clamour for a shift from foreign ownership to 
indigenous ownership of companies. To achieve this, the Nigerian government came up with two laws that 
changed the ownership structure of companies in the country. These laws were the Foreign Exchange Act 
of 1962 and the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree of 1972 (Indigenization Decree). The Indigenization 
Decree of 1972 influenced the acquisition of foreign investors’ shares by indigenous investors causing a 
major shift in the ownership structure of companies in Nigeria. The control of the means of production in 
socio-economic development of Nigeria also created the advent of indigenous ownership of companies 
leading to the growth of indigenous institutional investors. 
Past studies on the role of indigenous institutional investors and CSR have been contradictory (Earnhart 
and Lizal, 1999; 2002; Choe et al, 2005; Said et al, 2009). Earnhart and Lizal (1999) examined the effect 
of types of institutional investors on CSR using an unbalanced panel of 884 companies in 1998 and found 
a positive relationship between indigenous institutional investors and CSR. The authors argued that 
indigenous institutional investors perceive CSR as helping companies to lower fines and mitigate negative 
risk. This is because indigenous institutional investors are more knowledgeable about the concerns of the 
community. Accordingly, Earnhart and Lizal (1999) findings illustrates that different institutional investors 
show different preferences for CSR activities. 
In another study, Earnhart and Lizal (2002) presented the effect of different institutional investors on 
CSR. The authors studied the effects of privatisation policy from 1996 to 1998 using an unbalanced panel 
data and found that indigenous investors are positively related to CSR. In supporting the above findings, 
Choe et al (2005) found that in terms of trading experiences in Korea, indigenous institutional investors are 
better traders than foreign investors. They concluded that indigenous institutional investors have an edge 
over foreign investors as prices move up against foreign institutional investors in trading domestic stocks 
and shares. Also, indigenous institutional investors pay less when trading on small, medium and large stocks 
because of their understanding of the local market environment and trading experiences compared to 
foreign investors. Given these differences, the authors expect different institutional investors to have 
different preferences regarding social investments and performances of a firm. 
Based on empirical findings on the institutional theory, the following hypothesis has been proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a relationship between indigenous institutional investors and CSR. 
Foreign Institutional Investors and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Foreign investors have experienced a tremendous rise in Nigerian corporate sector after changes in 
government policy in 1995. The abolition in 1995 of the Exchange Control Act of 1962 and the Nigerian 
Enterprise Promotion Decree with partial abolition in 1989 and full abolition that took place in 1995, 
finally attracted foreign institutional investors to invest in Nigeria. The change in policy happened after it 
was noticed that the indigenization decree of 1972 was not creating confidence in the business 
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environment, especially when indigenous investors lacked the needed resources to boost economic growth 
and development. This was because the oil sector needed huge and technical resources which the indigenous 
investors could not provide on their own without foreign investors. This competitive advantage made the 
government to have a re-think on its policies to attract foreign investors (Yakasai, 2001). 
Generally, foreign institutional investors normally emanate from developed economies (Rasic, 2010). 
Prasanna (2008) argued that the foreign institutional investors provide the avenues for nations to have 
access to foreign capital which increases the level of economic activities and development (Song et al, 
2009). However, driven by the need for lower cost of production, cheaper labour, competition, profit 
maximization and increased globalization, foreign investors began to relocate or open branches in 
developing countries (Bondy et al, 2004; Clark and Hebb, 2005; Bondy, 2008; Carroll and Buchholz, 2009; 
Ghahroudi et al, 2010; Gul et al., 2020). 
Empirical findings on foreign institutional investors and CSR were also mixed and inconclusive (see, 
Dasgupta et al, 2000; Eckeland and Harrision, 2003; Prasanna, 2008; Song et al, 2009; Chai, 2010). Several 
researchers found small effect on the relationship between foreign institutional investors and CSR 
(Dasgupta et al, 2000). For example, Dasgupta et al (2000) concluded that foreign institutional investors 
have little effect on CSR. This finding indicates that foreign institutional investors lack experience and 
knowledge about the local environment; hence, find it difficult to engage in CSR. On a similar note, Cole 
et al (2008) examined the relationship between foreign institutional investors and CSR in Ghana and found 
that foreign institutional investors do not influence CSR practices in Ghana. 
Conversely, Chai (2010) examined the relationship between foreign institutional investors and CSR 
using panel data of 1,017 listed Korean firms and found a positive relationship between foreign institutional 
investors and CSR. The researcher argued that big companies with high advertising budgets and export 
orientation tend to favour CSR and concluded that CSR is strategic and discretionary, voluntary and 
embedded in the corporate philosophies of companies. Similarly, Eckeland and Harrision (2003) study 
showed a positive relationship between foreign institutional investors and CSR and argued that the foreign 
institutional investors are more involved in environmental management than indigenous investors. 
Nonetheless, Rasic (2010) found no relationship between foreign institutional investors and CSR. Rasic 
(2010) identified weak institution, lack of effective government regulation, high cost of new technologies 
as factors militating against companies from engaging in CSR, which suggests that foreign investors do not 
pressurize companies to engage in good environmental practices. 
Similarly, Ananchotikul (2008) argued that foreign institutional investors favour countries with weak 
corporate governance system because it enables them to exploit and take advantage of the minority and 
disperse shareholders. The author also found that foreign institutional investors behave like insiders and do 
not improve CSR and governance practices if their original country of origin has weak corporate 
governance and regulatory systems. This means that foreign institutional investors favour CSR and 
corporate governance practices if they believe that firstly, it will improve their performance and investment. 
Secondly, if it enables them to comply with existing regulatory laws, and finally, to have strong corporate 
governance experience from the country. Ananchotikul (2008) argued that the extent and level of 
relationship between foreign institutional investors and CSR governance depends on the amount of 
shareholding. For instance, if the level of shareholding is small, foreign institutional investors invest more 
in CSR. However, the author stated that, if the shareholding is large, foreign institutional investors become 
entrenched and show little or no interest in CSR and corporate governance practices. 
Following the above discussions coupled with empirical findings on institutional theory, the following 
hypothesis has been proposed: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between foreign institutional investors and CSR. 
Government Institutional Investors and Corporate Social Responsibility 
The rise of government institutional investors emerged because of inability of indigenous institutional 
investors to acquire all the shareholdings held by foreign institutional investors in Nigeria. The 
Indigenization Decree of 1972 in Nigeria influenced the acquisition of foreign investors’ shares by 
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indigenous investors. Most indigenous investors could not acquire all the shares and ownership structure 
because of lack of funds (Ahunwan, 2002; Okike, 2007). As a result, the government intervened by 
acquiring the outstanding shares which indigenous institutional investors could not purchase as at that time. 
This led to growth in government ownership of companies which attracted the presence of government 
institutional investors in Nigeria. 
Consequently, the government acquired the shares of foreign investors resulting in both state-owned 
companies by state governments and federal owned companies owned by the federal government. In this 
way, the government gained control of most public utilities. For example, the Odua Investment Group 
operated as a government institutional investor, incorporated as a Holding Company in July 1976, to take 
over the business interests of the former Western State of Nigeria now comprising Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Osun 
and Ekiti States (Yakasai, 2001; Ahunwan, 2002). However, the incursion of the government in the 
corporate sector and management of companies in Nigeria, particularly the reshaping of the ownership 
structure has raised some concerns in determining the influence on institutional ownership on CSR. 
Several studies on government institutional investors and CSR produced varied and inconclusive results 
(Earnhart and Lizal, 2002; Nazli and Ghazali, 2007; Said et al, 2009; Zhang et al, 2009; Li and Zhang, 
2010). For example, Nazli and Ghazali (2007) explored the relationship between government institutional 
investors and CSR practices in Malaysia and found a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between government institutional investors and CSR. The authors concluded that government institutional 
investors are important aspects of what influences CSR practices. Earnhart and Lizal (2002) showed that 
government institutional investors improve CSR. Similarly, Said et al (2009) found government 
institutional investors to be positively and significantly associated with CSR. Said et al (2009) argued that 
government investors can influence companies to allocate their resources towards CSR practices. The 
authors also explained that among the types of institutional investors, that government institutional 
investors are the most important corporate governance mechanism. Government institutional investors 
ensure PLCs comply with the legal requirements and accounting standards. Therefore, the positive 
association between government investors and CSR is aimed at reducing the agency cost as well as 
alleviating the agency problem between managers and shareholders, public and the stakeholders. The 
government institutional investors can reduce negative outcomes on companies by mandating companies 
to provide more disclosures and transparency thereby enhancing company legitimacy. However, Said et al 
(2009) findings of a positive relationship between government institutional investors and CSR contradicts 
the negative relationship perspective which has been suggested to exist between the government 
institutional investors and CSR (see, Zhang et al, 2009). 
Moreover, Li and Zhang (2010) found government institutional investors to be positively related to 
CSR. This positive relationship findings were supported by Dasgupta et al (1997). The authors argued 
that government institutional investors tend to engage in CSR to favour government policies. 
On the contrary, Zhang et al (2009) examined the role of institutional investors on CSR using 686 firms 
in China and found government institutional investors to be negatively related to CSR. The authors noted 
that government institutional investors do not favour CSR. The findings indicate that government owned 
companies are poor in managing company assets and make loss because they interfere with company 
operations. Nonetheless, Rasic (2010) found an insignificant relationship between government institutional 
investors and CSR and suggested that government institutional investors are inefficient in allocating firm 
resources. 
In view of the discussions above, coupled with empirical findings on institutional investors theory, the 
following hypothesis has been proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a relationship between government institutional investors and CSR. 
 
The review of both theoretical and empirical literature suggests that the role of different institutional 
investors in determining CSR has received considerable interest from researchers and scholars. In 
particular, the impact of different institutional investors in determining CSR practices in developed 
countries has been common. For example, Aguilera et al (2006) argued that institutional investors in 
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developed countries pay more attention to social and environmental concerns. Meanwhile, studies such as 
Aguilera et al (2006) are lacking in developing countries (Cole et al, 2008). However, this current study 
attempts to fill the gap by undertaking a vigorous investigation in the direction of Institutional Investors 




This research adopts a quantitative methodology which provides generalization and breadth as well as 
detailed perspectives of institutional investors and their influence on CSR (Ritchie and Lewis, 2006; 
Adegbite et. al., 2012). The methodological approach was aimed at reducing sample errors (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2005) and at the same time, allowed researchers to investigate specific effects of different 
institutional investors on CSR of PLCs in Nigeria. The quantitative methodology helped to achieve high 
data coverage which necessitated the use of findings from a representative sample to make predictions about 
the population (Saunders et. al., 2007). 
 
Data Collection 
The data on CSR was collected as CSR investment from annual report of companies for the year 2003 
to 2009. The research used random effect estimator to test the specific effects of different institutional 
investors on CSR of PLCs in Nigeria. This involved using balanced panel data of 174 PLCs from 2003 to 
2009 to obtain rich data from the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) Fact Book. 
To ensure validity, reliability and replicability of the study, the problem of multicollinearity (when two 
or more independent variables are correlated) was checked using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) while 
the problem of heteroskedasticity (residual error term variance not constant) was checked using Breusch- 
Pagan test. The problems were corrected using the robust standard error. The Hausman test was used to 
discriminate between the fixed effect and random effect estimators (Gujarati, 2007). 
 
The Regression Analysis and as It Relates to Causality 
This section used random effect estimator - a general linear modelling used to examine the relationship 
between dependent variables and independent variables, with the intent of examining the predictive ability 
of sets of independent variables (cause and effect) on dependent variables to further confirm the proposed 
relationships. Applying the regression analysis is borne out of the fact that relationships and predictions in 
real-life scenario, as in this case, are best established and made by a combination of factors. By applying 
this analysis, the relative contribution of each independent variable in explaining variance in the criterion 
variable has been determined. Specifically, the focus is on institutional investors, the predictor variables 
that cause and determine the variance in the outcome, the CSR investments. 
Another contribution to these cause and effect relationship is the control variable. The control variables 
were financial performance, risk, firm size, company age, industry effect, and debt. That is, the extent to 
which institutional investors and the control variables might contribute to the prediction of the perceived 
role of institutional investors for achieving and predicting CSR activities. Therefore, this can be interpreted 
as if it is the institutional investors that are leading the outcome in CSR investments, holding all the control 
variables constant. The results of these relationships are presented below. This analysis also aims to specify 
variable(s) that is (are) most accurate in predicting the outcome of CSR using random effect estimator. 
Since human behaviour is complex and could be influenced by many factors, it is expected that certain sets 
of independent variables might not completely give total or accurate predictions especially because the 
construct under investigation has been established to be a multidimensional construct. The random effect 
estimator reduced the multicollinearity problem and was best fit for the model to determine the cause and 
effect relationship. Importantly, these estimators also resolved the problem of omitted variable bias. 
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PRESENTATION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The random effect estimator was used to estimate the effects of the balanced panel of 174 PLCs from 
2003 to 2009. Model 1 tested hypothesis 1. This section discusses the results of the statistical analysis in 
relation to the effects of indigenous institutional investors, foreign institutional investors, and government 
institutional investors on CSR. 
 
The Role of Indigenous Investors 
The effects of indigenous investors on CSR are presented in Table 1. Model 1 tests hypothesis 1. The 
random effect estimator produces negative and insignificant result between the indigenous institutional 
investors and CSR (b = -0.039; P=0.81). This is similar to Rasic (2010) which found no relationship 
between indigenous institutional investors and CSR. Rasic (2010) identified weak institutions, high cost 
of new technologies as the militating factors against CSR. 
 
TABLE 1 
THE EFFECTS OF INDIGENOUS INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CSR 
 
Variables Random Effect Model 
Indigenous Investors -0.039(0.115) 
Number of employees 0.558(0.786)*** 
Age of Company 0.707(0.253)*** 
EPS 0.005(0.012) * 
Risk -0.021(0.011) * 
Debt 0.006(0.010) 
ROA -0.008(0.001) 
Industry effect 0.545(0.222)** 
Number of groups(n) 174 
Number of Observation(N) 1218 
Within R2 0.22 
Between R2 0.08 
Overall R2 0.09 
R Square adjusted 0.17 
Intercept 10.02(1.08)*** 
Heteroscedasticity chi2 (p-value) 0.78(0.377) 
Multicollinearity (Mean VIF=1.25) 1.48 
Woodridge test for autocorrelation results 10.20(0.002) 
Hausman Test 34.93 
VIF is the Variance Inflation Factor used to test for Multicollinearity. Robust standard error 
is used for pooled cross sectional, random effect and fixed effect models. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All variables marked ***, **and * are significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The Hausman test refers to the test of the null 
hypothesis of the random effect against the fixed effect estimators, b represents the 
coefficient and p is the p-value. 
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The Role of Foreign Institutional Investors    
Table 2 shows the result/analysis on the effects of foreign institutional investors on CSR investments. 
Also, Model 2 tests hypothesis 2. The random effect estimator produced negative and insignificant results, 
b = -0.057 and P=0.76. 
Again, the random effect estimator showed that foreign investors have a negative and non-significant 
effect on CSR. These findings mean 1% increase in foreign institutional investors results in 0.24% decrease 
in CSR investments, and holds all the control variables (z) constant. However, the findings reject hypothesis 
2, that predicted a positive relationship between foreign institutional investors and CSR. 
The negative and insignificant result indicates that foreign institutional investors do not influence CSR 
among PLCs in Nigeria. This is similar to the findings of Dasgupta et al (2000). Dasgupta et al (2000) found 
no effect between foreign ownership and CSR which indicates that foreign institutional investors lack 
experience and knowledge about the local environment; hence foreign investors find it difficult to engage 
in CSR. Similarly, Rasic (2010) found no relationship between foreign institutional investors and CSR, 
having a value of Chi2 = 6.27; P=0.652. 
Moreover, the R square for the random effect estimator is 0.22. This implies that the independent 
variables in the model accounted for 22% variations in CSR investments which signifies a good fit for the 
model (Benson et al, 2009). It means that the explanatory variables in the model explain the CSR 
investments by 22%. This is consistent with the findings of Andayani et al (2008) that got a slightly higher 
R-square value of 0.376, while Benson et al (2009) found R2 to be 0.08. 
 
TABLE 2 
THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CSR 
 
Variables Random Effect Model 
Foreign Investors -0.057(0.170) 
Number of employees 0.557(0.050)*** 
Age of Company 0.707(0.254)*** 
EPS 0.005(0.010) 
Risk -0.021(0.011) * 
Debt 0.006(0.010) 
ROA -0.001(0.001) 
Industry effect 0.543(0.222)* * * 
Number of groups(n) 174 
Number of Observation(N) 1218 
Within R2 0.22 
Between R2 0.08 
Overall R2 0.09 
R Square adjusted 0.17 
Intercept 9.64(1.114)*** 
Heteroscedasticity chi2=6.11 (p-value) 0.81(0.38) 
Multicollinearity (Mean VIF=1.25) 1.49 
Woodridge test for autocorrelation results 10.20(0.002) 
Hausman Test 35.67 
VIF is the Variance Inflation Factor used to test for Multicollinearity. Robust standard 
error is used for pooled cross sectional, random effect and fixed effect models. 
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The Role of Government Institutional Investors 
Table 3 shows the result/analysis on the effects of government institutional investors on CSR. Model 3 
also, tests hypothesis 3. The random effect estimator produced negative and insignificant results (b = - 
0.145; p = 0.62). See Table 3 for details of result. 
The findings mean that 1% increase in government institutional investors results in 0.15% decrease in 
CSR investments, and holds all the control variables (z) constant. These findings indicate that as the 
government increases its shareholding, the CSR investments decline. However, the findings reject 
hypothesis 3, which predicted a positive relationship between government institutional investors and CSR. 
 
TABLE 3 
THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT INVESTORS ON CSR 
 
Variables Random Effect Model 
Government Investor -0.296(0.185) 
Number of employees 0.562(0.079)*** 
Age of Company 0.709(0.253)*** 
EPS 0.005(0.012) 
Risk -0.021(0.011) * 
Debt 0.006(0.010) 
ROA -0.001(0.001) 
Industry effect 0.471(0.220)** 
Number of groups(n) 174 
Number of Observation(N) 1218 
Within R2 0.22 
Between R2 0.09 
Overall R2 0.09 
R Square adjusted  
Intercept 8.78(1.035)*** 
Heteroscedasticity chi2=6.11 (p-value) 0.73(0.393) 
Multicollinearity (Mean VIF=1.25) 1.50 
Woodridge test for autocorrelation results 10.03(0.002) 
Hausman Test 33.51 
VIF is the Variance Inflation Factor used to test for Multicollinearity. Robust standard 
error is used for pooled cross sectional, random effect and fixed effect models. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All variables marked ***, **and * are 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The Hausman test refers to the test of 
the null hypothesis of the random effect against the fixed effect models, b represents the 
coefficient and p is the p-value. 
 
Given the above discussions on the effect of indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors 
on CSR, it was discovered that different institutional investors; indigenous, foreign and government 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All variables marked ***, **and * are significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The Hausman test refers to the test of the null 
hypothesis of the random effect against the fixed effect estimators, b represents the 
coefficient and p is the p-value. 
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institutional investors reveal insignificant relationship with CSR. This means that institutional investors 
have no preferences for CSR in Nigeria which suggests that institutional investors do not influence CSR. 
 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
This study focused on the role institutional investors’ play in determining the CSR practices in publicly 
listed companies (PLCs). Given that it is an area of study that is under-investigated, the study adopted an 
institutional theoretical perspective in developing the theoretical framework. The institutional theory 
suggests that an organization is an adaptive mechanism that is shaped according to participants’ 
characteristics, influences, constraints and commitments. 
The external environment refers to the repeated processes that have similar meanings over a period of 
time such as Code of Ethics, Standard Practice and CSR. The role of institutional investors in influencing 
these CSR processes produced minimal or insignificant result from the findings. This indicates that 
organisational arrangements towards CSR are not designed or influenced by institutional investors, but 
maybe economic, social, cultural and political factors and processes (Selznick, 1957; 2004). 
According to Campbell (2006) while arguing that governance rules, norms and standards influence 
companies to engage in CSR; the authors also argued that rules and punitive sanctions, for example, 
imposing sanctions against irresponsible companies through fines and fees restrain corporate behaviour or 
influence companies to invest in CSR. Campbell (2006) concluded that companies engage in CSR if they 
encounter pressure for compliance to government regulations, rules and laws. 
The implications of the study are for managers to realize the importance and dynamics of a changing 
world through globalization. It also implies that institutional investors help to shape changes through 
influence on CSR. However, despite lack of influence from institutional investors, the interest of managers 
should be aligned to investors’ interests to ensure long term survival of the company and also create a win- 




This study focused on Nigeria and the role of different institutional investors - foreign, indigenous and 
government in determining the CSR practices of listed companies and found no significant relationship 
between institutional ownership and CSR. 
The study not only contributes to the understanding of how the role of institutional investors’ affects 
CSR, it also fills a methodological gap in Corporate Governance and CSR studies in Nigeria. As a 
developing economy, the findings are essentially useful for policy makers in Nigeria and would guide 
companies to improve on their CSR practices in host communities. 
Future studies should focus on determining the extent in which causality and generalized method of 
moments or 2-stage least square can be employed. Qualitative methods can be used to explore and have a 




1. The economic field focuses on individual as rational utility maximisers if institutions provide benefits greater 
than cost to the individual. The political perspectives refer to the way political institutions influence decisions, 
structures, processes, forms and outcomes while sociological perspective focuses on the new institutional 
theory, hence the most suitable for gaining insight into how corporations interact with the environment (Scott, 
2004; Bondy, 2008). 
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